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Critical Discourse Analysis has recently begun to consider the implications of research in 
Evolutionary Psychology for political communication.  At least three positions have been taken:  (i) 
that this research requires Critical Discourse Analysis to re-examine and defend some of its 
foundational assumptions (Chilton 2005); (ii) that this research provides a useful explanatory 
framework for Critical Discourse Analysis in which questions can be addressed why might speakers 
pursue particular discursive strategies and why they might be so persuasive (Hart 2010);  and (iii) that 
findings bare little or no relevance for Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak 2006).  In this paper, I take 
up the first two of these positions and in doing so, of course, implicitly disagree with the third.  I 
consider the positions in (i) and (ii), then, specifically in relation to Sperber’s (2000, 2001) notion of a 
‘logico-rhetorical’ module.   Taking the argument which Chilton makes concerning this module one 
stage further, I suggest that the logico-rhetorical module evolved as much for persuasion as it did for 
vigilance.  I further suggest that the semantic category of evidentiality operationalised in media 
discourse is intended to satisfy the conditions of acceptance laid down by the logico-rhetorical 
module.  I show how this semantic category therefore performs a legitimising function in media 
discourse on immigration. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper is an attempt to show that recent research in Evolutionary Psychology can make a useful 
contribution to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) situated at the explanation stage.
1
  Within 
Fairclough’s (1995) tripartite model of discourse analysis, it is description-stage analysis which has 
received most attention (Chilton 2005: 24).  However, as O’Halloran (2003) observes, there has by 
and large been a vacuum of interpretation-stage analysis and specifically, ‘anything to do with 
cognition at the interpretation stage has not received comprehensive scrutiny’ (p. 3).  Similarly, at the 
explanation stage a dynamic space has been created for interdisciplinary work combining text analysis 
with sociocultural theory.  However, absent from the theoretical bases of CDA is biologically-based 
explanation (O’Halloran 2005: 1945).  In this paper, then, I offer a biologically-based explanation as 
to the use and effect of a particular ‘strategy’ in media discourse.  This strategy, which we will 
characterise as an ‘epistemic positioning strategy’, is a linguistic strategy involved in the 
legitimisation of assertions, a necessary move in the discursive legitimisation of actions.  It may be 
realised inter alia in the semantic domain of evidentiality and has the effect, we will argue, of meeting 
the demands of a ‘logico-rhetorical’ module, thereby allowing propositions to be accepted by 
                                                             
1 This is part of a research program in Critical Discourse Analysis incorporating two areas of Cognitive Science, 
namely Cognitive Linguistics and Evolutionary Psychology, to complement one and other at the interpretation 
and explanation stage respectively  (see Hart 2010).   
addressees as true.  We examine this strategy in the context of print news media discourse on 
immigration.   
 
In Section 2 I introduce Evolutionary Psychology and its theoretical efficacy for CDA.  In Section 3 I 
discuss the evolution of a logico-rhetorical module and its implications for CDA in light of a recent 
‘crisis’ (cf. Chilton 2005).  In Section 4 I present the legitimisation of assertions as an important 
strategy in media discourse and in Section 5 I show how the semantic domain of evidentiality operates 
pragmatically in media discourse on immigration to provide the ‘external coherence’ that addressees, 
as a function of the logico-rhetorical module, look for before accepting messages as true. 
 
 
2.  Background: CDA and Evolutionary Psychology 
 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP) presents a Darwinian approach to the study of human cognitive 
systems and behavioural patterns.  It is committed to the ‘massive modularity hypothesis’ and 
therefore views the mind as a set of domain-specific but interconnected mental modules, each of 
which is ‘functionally responsible for solving a different adaptive problem’ (Cosmides and Tooby 
2000a: 91).  EP, then, seeks to provide an explanatory framework in which contemporary cognitive 
systems and behavioural patterns can be seen as adaptations selected to meet the needs of our 
ancestors (Cosmides and Tooby 1997).  Adaptations are therefore not adapted to contemporary 




In identifying adaptive modules, evolutionary psychologists adopt ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ 
research methods (Schmitt 2008).  In bottom-up methods, researchers take a known universal 
psychological mechanism and ‘reverse-engineer’ its evolution (ibid. p. 26).  This involves 
constructing hypotheses about a trait’s adaptive function.  These are not ‘just-so’ stories as some 
critics suggest (Gould 1991) but plausible hypotheses which emerge from what is known about the 
ancestral environment (AE).  In top-down methods, researchers make testable predictions about the 
existence of adapted psychological mechanisms based on expectations derived from evolutionary 
theories.  For example, the theory of reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) predicts the existence of a 
cheater-detection module (Cosmides 1989; Cosmides and Tooby 1992).  The cheater-detection 
module evolved to redress the risk of exploitation in long-term, cooperative systems of social 
exchange (ibid.).  Similarly, the evolution of communication predicts the existence of a logico-
rhetorical module (Sperber 2000, 2001).   
 
The key claim of EP for CDA is that cognitive adaptations selected in the ancestral environment 
remain in modern minds to be activated in equivalent contemporary situations.  Such situations, of 
course, can be discursively constructed.  For example, discursive constructions of immigrants and 
asylum seekers as ‘social cheats’ are likely to activate the cheater-detection module and, in turn, 
weight decisions in favour of discriminatory social practices.  Hart (2010) uses EP to predict the 
cognitive impact of particular argumentation schemes (topoi) identified in CDA (cf. Reisigl and 
Wodak 2001).  He argues that certain predications in immigration discourse may provide the 
antecedent that triggers specific cognitive modules which, in turn, affect decision-making processes.  
Significant modules include the cheater-detection module and emotion modules such as fear and 
anger.   
 
O’Halloran (2005) uses EP in an entirely different way as a ‘lens’ through which agent mystification 
in discourse on child sex offences can be detected.  In an analysis of campaign texts from 
www.forsarah.com he found that ‘relational identification’ (van Leeuwen 1996) was absent for 
precisely those agents that EP predicts are most likely to commit child sex offences.  Such absences 
have the effect of removing any (explicit or implicit) references to the home as the site of sexual 
abuse and instead contribute to constructing a ‘preferred’ narrative of non-familial child abuse.  
                                                             
2 The ancestral environment is not a specified place or time but the ‘statistical composite of selection pressures 
that caused the design of an adaptation’ (Cosmides and Tooby 1997: 12). 
O’Halloran also suggests that EP can provide ‘theoretical constraints’ on CDA which help to address 
problems of over-interpretation and analytical subjectivity (cf. O’Halloran 2003; Widdowson 2004). 
 
Some researchers in CDA see no place for EP.  For example, Wodak (2006) chooses to ignore recent 
discussions concerning the evolutionary dimensions of discrimination because ‘no convincing 
arguments ... have yet been brought to light’ (p. 187).  However, I have since argued (I hope 
convincingly) that discrimination in contemporary society is best accounted for within a model that 
connects communication with evolved cognition (see Hart 2010).  Note that this is not a biologically 
determinist position as some might charge.  Evolved cognition does not predispose us to 
discriminatory behaviour but may be exploited in Machiavellian ways by speakers looking to 
legitimise discriminatory practices.  This is because once in place, adapted cognitive modules may be 
mobilised in alternative, contemporary conditions for purposes beyond their proper function (Sperber 
1994).  Such strategic communication, of course, relies on the addressee accepting as true the false, 
partial or distorted representations of reality which seem to justify discrimination.   
 
CDA often assumes that representations of this kind become ‘naturalised’ inside an order of discourse 
and that addressees are therefore likely to accept them automatically as true and accurate (Fairclough 
1989).  And that such representations, in turn, automatically yield particular conclusions in 
argumentation schemes known as topoi (Reisigl and Wodak 2001).  The business of CDA is then seen 
as intervention.  However, one of the problems with CDA is that ‘the reader simply is not theorised’ 
(Fowler 1996: 7).  CDA has had comparatively less to say at the interpretation stage of analysis than it 
has at the description stage (cf. O’Halloran 2003; Chilton 2005; Hart 2010).  Chilton (2005) draws on 
recent research in EP to suggest that the assumption that addressees so readily accept representations 
as true and accurate may be misfounded and that CDA, if it does not re-address this fundamental 
issue, could be left redundant.
3
  This argument is built around the proposal of a so-called ‘logico-
rhetorical’ module, which emerges as a natural expectation in the evolution of communication. 
 
 
3.  The Logico-Rhetorical Module 
 
A cooperative system like human communication (Grice 1975; Sperber and Wilson 1995) could not 
have evolved in the first place unless it evolved for the exchange of honest information (Sperber 
2001; Hurford 2007).  If the first speakers were not honest, then addressees would not have attended 
to their communications and the practice would soon have been selected out.  Similarly, if honest 
speakers did not receive honest information in return, then they would soon have stopped sharing 
valuable information and communication would then too have folded.
4
  Once in place, however, 
communication, like any system of social cooperation, was susceptible to exploitation, which in the 
case of communication takes the form of deception and distortion for purposes of persuasion (Origgi 
and Sperber 2000: 161).  There would have been significant short-term advantages for speakers to 
communicate false or distorted information which served their own interests but which did not 
necessarily meet the interests of the hearer.
5
 This is not to say that individuals would try to deceive 
their interlocutors on all occasions of use.  Only that we should expect individuals to attempt to coerce 
others some of the time, in certain, specific situations, and for the effects of being misinformed to be 
serious.
6
  Indeed, according to many researchers, communication evolved as much for manipulation 
and as it did for cooperation (e.g. Desalles 1998, 2007; Sperber 2000, 2001).   
 
                                                             
3  O’Halloran (2003) argues that this assumption applies only to an ‘idealised reader’. 
4  This is assuming, as is widely accepted (Ulbaek 1998), that communication evolved through reciprocal 
(Trivers 1971; Axelrod 1984) rather than kin-selected (Hamilton 1964) altruism. 
5  In EP this is known as ‘tactical deception’ and it relies on a suite of cognitive processes, including  
metarepresentation, Theory of Mind and social inferencing, which when used in this way are collectively 
known as ‘Machiavellian intelligence’. 
6  Such situations can be expected to include those in which the potential gain to be had by misinforming 
outweighs the cost of any subsequent punishment as a factor of the risk of discovery involved. 
Communication, of course, continued to be selected for despite the potential risks of exploitation.  
According to Sperber (2000, 2001), this has to do with the fact that individuals are both speakers and 
addressees who stood to gain obvious long-term net benefits from reciprocal acts of honest 
information exchange.  There were thus significant selection pressures toward the sustained 
development of language but which were dependent on a solution to the problem of exploitation.  The 
evolution of communication therefore predicts that some form of cognitive defence must have co-
evolved.  Following Sperber (2000: 135), ‘the human reliance on communication is so great, the risks 
of deception and manipulation so ubiquitous, that it is reasonable to speculate that all cost-effective 
available modes of defence are likely to have evolved’.  One such mechanism proposed by Sperber is 
a ‘logico-rhetorical’ module.  This module evolved ‘as a means of reaping the benefits of 
communication while limiting the costs’ and ‘originated as a defence against the risks of deception’ 
(Sperber 2001).  As Chilton (2004: 21) points out, ‘humans do not, or do not have to process 
incoming messages as already true’.  Comprehension and acceptance are two distinct processes in 
communication (Sperber 2000, 2001; Sperber et al. 2010; Origgi and Sperber 2000).  Speakers 
therefore have two goals in communication: to be understood and to affect the beliefs and behaviours 
of their audience.  Hearers similarly have two goals: to understand and to acquire true and useful 
information.  The interests of both parties are convergent in the first goal but not necessarily in the 
second.  The logico-rhetorical module therefore operates at the stage between comprehension and 
acceptance to ensure the calibration of trust and filter incoming messages based on assessments of 
truth and relevance (Sperber 2000: 135).
7
   
 
Sperber (2001) proposes several forms of defence for which the logico-rhetorical module is 
responsible.  These involve attending to what he calls the ‘internal’ and the ‘external coherence’ of the 
message.
8
  Internal coherence refers to logical relations between propositions.  Addressees ‘keep 
track’ of assertions made in the course of the discourse and monitor them for logical inconsistencies 
with one and other.  External coherence refers to situational relations of support.  For example, 
addressees can pay attention to behavioural signs of sincerity or insincerity in the speaker.  Other 
situational features the addressee might attend to include the reputation of the speaker as a competent 
and benevolent communicator or the evidence or basis on which the assertion is made.  The checking 
of external coherence can therefore be characterised, at least in part, as attending to the felicity 
conditions that underlie the illocutionary act of assertion.  Specifically, the sincerity condition that the 
speaker believes the assertion to be true and the preparatory conditions that (i) the speaker is qualified 
to make the assertion and (ii) that there is some basis or evidence on which the assertion is made.  
This tripartite distinction is necessary because an honest and knowledgeable communicator may still 
sometimes be mistaken and so addressees would always do well to search for evidence.  Conversely, 
of course, there may be instances when the weight of the evidence provides sufficient grounds to 
accept the communicated proposition regardless of the reputation of the speaker.  
 
Drawing on this body of research, Chilton (2005: 43) argues that the claims and aims that characterise 
CDA are problematised.  Indeed, according to Chilton, ‘it is possible that taking stock of recent 
research in the cognitive sciences leads us to the conclusion that we do not actually need CDA’ (2005: 
22).  This research, for example, calls into question the assumption that addressees readily accept 
representations as true or ‘natural’ and, as a result, raises questions concerning the efficacy of CDA, at 
least in so far as CDA is seen primarily as an interventionist enterprise.  If, as the research seems to 
suggest, addressees exercise their own form of epistemic vigilance, then what is the role of the critical 
discourse analyst?  Or as Chilton (2005: 44)  puts it:  ‘if people have a natural ability to treat verbal 
input critically, in what sense can CDA ... reveal in discourse what people can (by the hypothesis) 
already detect for themselves?’. 
                                                             
7  Although we are presenting it as a serial process, this is just a matter of convenience.  In reality, the 
cognitive processes involved in communication are likely to take place in parallel (Sperber et al. 2010).  
8  More recently, Sperber et al. (2010) refer to ‘epistemic vigilance’ directed at the content and the source of 
communication.   
 
 This research, then, as Chilton highlights, calls for CDA to reconsider its fundamental claims and the 
contributions which, as a result, it can realistically make.  However, such a reassessment, I want to 
suggest, still leads to the need for CDA.   This is because the story so far covers only the ‘first step in 
a persuasion-counterpersuasion arms race’ (Sperber 2000: 136).  According to Sperber (2001), the 
next step in this spiral consisted in speakers displaying the very coherence, or at least the appearance 
of it, that they can expect hearers to check for.  Following Sperber, communication is ‘even more 
advantageous, if, while protected from the deception of others without being overprotected, you can 
penetrate their protection and deceive them’ (2000: 135).  In this case, the logico-rhetorical module 
evolved as much for manipulation as it did for defence.  It is an ‘evaluation and persuasion 
mechanism’ designed to ‘help audiences decide what messages to accept, and to help communicators 
produce messages that will be accepted’ (Sperber 2001).  At least on this account, then, the 
significance of CDA is theoretically justified. 
 
Texts can display internal coherence through argumentative forms conjoining propositions and 
creating apparently logical relations between them.  It is usually assumed that the para-logical 
vocabulary involved (e.g., so, therefore) is adapted for reflection and reasoning.  However, it may 
alternatively be viewed as a tool for speakers to convince audiences of the truth of their messages 
through argumentation rather than simple testimony (Sperber 2001).  Indeed, the evolution of 
communication predicts that this should be its proper function (ibid.).  It is also well documented in 
the psychological literature on argumentation that audiences do, as a function of an adapted drive 
toward cognitive efficiency, accept fallacious arguments as valid (see Maillat and Oswald 2011).   
 
Similarly, certain contextual and linguistic features of particular text genres may provide external 
coherence.  In media discourse, of course, behavioural signs of sincerity cannot be evaluated since 
production and reception do not co-occur.  However, the media generally enjoys an institutionalised 
right of narration and people tend to place some stock in the media as a source of information.  For 
some people, then, for whatever reason, the logico-rhetorical module may be improperly calibrated 
toward trust in this particular genre.  Chilton (2005) recognises that there may be certain 
circumstances in which the operation of the logico-rhetorical module is skewed.  However, any 
critical analysis here, he argues, might need to be of the social, historical, political and economic 
conditions surrounding the communicative act rather than of the language itself used (p. 45).  As we 
have already suggested, though, acceptance is not based solely on assessments of the speaker but also 
on evidence for the assertion.  News reporters therefore cannot just rely on the reputation of the media 
but must provide reasons as to why their audience should accept their assertion as true.  And this is a 
linguistic matter for one way that speakers can provide evidence for their assertions is through the 
semantic domain of evidentiality.  Evidentiality therefore serves a legitimising function in media 
discourse.  The legitimising function, however, is the legitimisation of assertions, upon which the 
legitimisation of actions depends. 
 
 
4.  Legitimisation and Evidentiality 
 
CDA has done important work in identifying the ‘common-sense’ reasoning exploited in the rhetoric 
of racism (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Dijk 2000a/b).  These 
researchers have uncovered a number of topoi commonly used in anti-immigration discourse.  Topoi 
are ‘content-related warrants’ in which an assertion functions as a first premise in an argument whose 
conclusion is taken for granted as self-evident and therefore does not need to be spelled out (Reisigl 
and Wodak 2001).  The conclusion of most topoi in anti-immigration discourse is the need for some 
form of social exclusion.  The argument, of course, may be fallacious.  But it is precisely because 
conclusions in favour of social exclusion are presupposed by certain premises that those assertions 
functioning as first premises serve to legitimise discriminatory practices.  The successful justification 
of action, however, requires that the hearer accept the justifying assertion as true in the first place.  So 
whilst the move from the premise to the conclusion may be seen as common sense, even if it is in fact 
fallacious, the move is only likely to be made if the audience accepts as true the initial premise.  There 
are thus two macro-level speaker strategies involved in discriminatory discourse: the legitimisation of 
actions and the legitimisation of assertions. 
 
Several typologies of strategy in political discourse have been put forward with various strategies 
proposed and similar strategies organised at different levels of subordination (cf. Chilton and 
Schäffner 1997; Reisigl and Wodak 2001).
9
  In the typology I propose, the legitimisation of actions 
and the legitimisation of assertions are two superordinate speaker (or argumentation) strategies which 
three types of micro-level, linguistic (or representation) strategy serve to support and where the 
former is dependent on the latter.  These three types of micro-level strategies are based in the general 
cognitive processes of attention, comparison and perspective and are realised in various different 
construal operations (see Hart 2011).  Identification concerns which social actors are referred to, 
explicitly or implicitly, in which semantic roles and to what degree of salience.  Framing concerns 
how entities, actions, events and processes, through categorisation and metaphor or simple 
predication, are ascribed particular positive or negative qualities.  Positioning can be deictic or 
epistemic.  Deictic positioning concerns the relations held between elements in the ‘discourse world’ 
and can be social, spatial or temporal (cf. Chilton 2004; Cap 2006).  And epistemic positioning 
concerns the epistemic status of the proposition.  It is epistemic positioning that is involved in the 
legitimisation of assertions, whilst identification, framing and deictic positioning are involved in the 
legitimisation of actions, as represented in Figure 1. 
 
 





 Legitimisation of Assertions                    Epistemic positioning 
 
 
Figure 1.  Legitimisation in political discourse 
 
 
Epistemic positioning has been discussed elsewhere (e.g. Bednarek 2006a) and is clearly related to the 
strategy of ‘intensification’ identified by Reisigl and Wodak and defined as helping to ‘qualify or 
modify the epistemic status of a proposition’ (2001:  45).  Epistemic positioning here, however, is 
seen specifically as an (unconscious) attempt on behalf of the speaker to influence the hearer’s 
epistemic stance toward the proposition in such a way that their logico-rhetorical module is satisfied 
and the assertion is thereby accepted.
10
  And moreover, whilst Reisigl and Wodak make no mention of 
evidentiality, this semantic domain is seen here as an important means by which speakers can hope to 
achieve acceptance.  The legitimisation of assertions is then characterised as a process by which 
speakers, in order to overcome the epistemic safeguards of their audience, offer ‘guarantees’ for the 
truth of their assertions in various forms of evidence.   
 
Bednarek (2006a) observes the key role that evidentiality plays in epistemic positioning.  
Surprisingly, however, this semantic domain has scarcely even featured on the radar of most 
mainstream critical discourse analysts.
11
 For example, both Fairclough (1989) and Fowler (1991) 
                                                             
9  ‘Strategies’ are defined in CDA as more or less intentional or institutionalised plans of practices, including 
discourse practices, whose adoption achieves some social, psychological or linguistic effect (Reisigl and 
Wodak 2001: 44).  
10  Epistemic stance may be conceptually grounded in a complex cognitive model involving distance, deixis and 
force-dynamics where evidence stands as a metaphorical ‘force’ behind the proposition moving it toward the 
hearer’s conception of reality (see Hart 2010). 
11  Though see van Dijk (2000a/b, 2011). 
discuss epistemic modality at length but fail to recognise the strategic significance of evidentiality.  
This is in spite of the fact that the two domains, evidentiality and epistemic modality, are so intimately 
connected as expressions of legitimisation.  Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) similarly discuss a 
range of legitimisation strategies to which evidentiality is relevant, including authorisation and 
rationalisation, but fail to explicitly address the role that evidentiality plays in these strategies. 
Evidentiality, of course, has been the subject of comprehensive investigation in typological language 
studies (e.g. Givón 1982; Wilett 1988).  Here, it is primarily grammatical and morphological systems 
of evidentiality that have been of interest (Aikhenvald 2004: 6; Mushin 2001: 35).  As a result, 
English has been more or less excluded from research on evidentiality (Bednarek 2006a: 636).  
Certainly, the pragmatic functions of evidentiality in English media discourse have not been seriously 




Evidentiality marks the basis of the speaker’s knowledge concerning the state of affairs reported in the 
assertion.  That is, evidentials indicate how the speaker has come to know what they are claiming.  
Various types of evidence have been identified and different classifications can be found across the 
literature.  However, these tend to cluster around binary distinctions between direct and indirect or 
firsthand and secondhand means of knowing (Wilett 1988; de Haan 2001).  Direct forms of evidence 
include sensory-perceptual acquisitions of knowledge.  Indirect forms include knowledge based on 
inference and knowledge gained from third-party sources.  The semantic domain of evidentiality can 


















Figure 2.  The semantic domain of evidentiality 
 
 
The semantic domain of evidentiality is closely connected with that of epistemic modality and the two 
have been analysed in various relations of inclusion and subordination.
13
  Most researchers (e.g. 
Palmer 1986) have analysed evidentiality as an expression of epistemic modality.  However, others 
have subsumed epistemic modality under the banner of evidentiality (e.g. Chafe 1986).  Still others 
see evidentiality and epistemic modality as distinct semantic domains but which are obviously 
intimately bound (de Haan 1999; Nuyts 2001).  For these researchers, the speaker’s epistemic stance 
(as reflected in modality) is determined by the nature of the evidence they have for their assertion 
(Nuyts 2001: 27). On this account, it is only epistemic modality that involves an evaluation on the part 
of the speaker (ibid.) where depending on the means of knowing, one can be more or less confident in 
and therefore committed to the truth of one’s assertion.  As de Haan (1999: 85) puts it: ‘epistemic 
modality evaluates evidence and on this evaluation assigns a confidence measure to the speaker’s 
                                                             
12  Though see Marín Arrese (2004, 2011).  See Chafe (1986) and Biber and Finegan (1989) on evidentiality in 
other text genres. 
13  See Dendale and Tasmowski (2001) for overview and discussion. 
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utterance’ whilst ‘an evidential asserts that there is evidence for the speaker’s utterance but does not 
interpret the evidence in any way’.  However, Mushin (2001: 58) notes that ‘speakers are motivated to 
adopt a particular epistemological stance partially on the basis of their source of information, but also 
on the basis of their rhetorical intentions, on how they want their utterance to be understood and 
treated in the moment of interaction’.  From the point of view of the audience in news discourse, then, 
epistemic modal markers, including zero-marked modality, can be analysed as evidentials.  They at 
least imply that the speaker has some evidence for their assertion, even if it is not explicitly spelled 
out.  Indeed, total commitment of the speaker in non-hedged modality may be taken as evidence for 
the truth of their assertion on the assumption that the speaker is confident enough to make a 
categorical claim when they wouldn’t want later to be undermined and lose credibility. 
 
This leads to two epistemic positioning strategies for legitimising assertions which we can call 
‘subjectification’ and ‘objectification’ (Hart 2010).  The two strategies are manifested in epistemic 
modality and evidentiality respectively.  The distinction between them has to do with how confident 
the speaker is that the hearer will ‘take their word’ for the truth of the assertion.  Subjectification 
profiles the speaker’s assessment of the proposition and as a legitimising device relies solely on their 
reputation as a reliable source of information with perhaps privileged access to certain states of affairs 
or means of knowing.  It is realised in expressions of epistemic certainty such as must, will, and zero-
marked modality.  Objectification, by contrast, makes available to the hearer the speaker’s means of 
knowing.  In effect, objectification suggests that the speaker’s assertion can be verified or that it is 
corroborated by others.  Crucially, it provides the hearer with the option to ‘check for themselves’.  
Objectification is particularly apparent in media discourse since ‘the news story is a genre that is 
preoccupied with knowledge’ (Bednarek 2006a: 639).  In the next section, we turn to categories of 





5.  Evidentiality in Media Discourse on Immigration 
 
In a corpus analysis, Bednarek (2006a) identifies four specified bases of knowledge used as evidence 
in British newspaper reportage: PERCEPTION, PROOF, OBVIOUSNESS and PUBLIC  
KNOWLEDGE. These bases of knowledge provide legitimacy to propositions in different ways but 
they all provide external coherence to the author’s claims.  They can be related to the different types 
of evidence identified in Figure 2. PERCEPTION provides directly attested sensory evidence. 
PROOF and OBVIOUSNESS both constitute indirect evidence inferred from results and reasoning 
respectively.  And PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE is reflected in indirect reported folklore.  We can further 
identify EXPERT KNOWLEDGE as a form of evidence reflected in hearsay.  EPISTEMIC 
COMMITMENT can also be considered a form of evidence in so far as it suggests the speaker is 
‘qualified with the knowledge required to pass judgement’ (Fowler 1991: 64).  In other words, 
EPISTEMIC COMMITMENT includes a claim to authority on the topic at hand (Fowler 1985; 
Fairclough 1989) which, if believed, implies something about the competence of the speaker and 
serves to satisfy the first preparatory condition for assertion.  These forms of evidence can be arranged 
on a sliding scale of reliability which corresponds to the degree of speaker subjectivity involved as in 
Figure 3. 
 
PERCEPTION is the most objective and therefore most reliable form of evidence.  PROOF and 
OBVIOUSNESS both involve some degree of subjectivity since they are based on speaker 
interpretations.  However, they both imply that these are objectively rationale interpretations.  
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE refers to subjective processes but not, or not only, of the speaker.  It may, of 
                                                             
14  Examples are intended as illustrative only, although they are all attested, taken from a corpus of newspaper 
articles on immigration and asylum published in the UK between 2000 and 2006.  During this period, the 
European Union expanded twice and two UK General Elections were held.  Largely fuelled by the media, 
the 2005 General Election was heavily focussed on the issue of immigration and extreme right-wing parties 
like the UK Independence Party and the British National Party gained significant ground. 
course, involve intersubjectivity if the hearer already shares this knowledge (Nuyts 2001).  EXPERT 
KNOWLEDGE similarly involves subjective processes of others but the attribution is to a specific 
individual or organisation that the speaker assumes the hearer will consider authoritative.  
EPISTEMIC COMMITMENT is the least objective form of evidence, and therefore the least reliable, 
















Figure 3.  Reliability of evidence and degree of subjectivity 
 
 
Evidence from PERCEPTION is exemplified in (1) - (4): 
 
(1) The Sun, 25 April 2003 
 Often it appears that these immigrants are looked after much better than our own people. 
 
(2) Daily Mail, 27 July 2005 
 Britain is operating an asylum system  ... visibly loaded in favour of any foreigner ... staying 
 here indefinitely  
 
(3) Mail on Sunday, 27 Feb. 2000 
 Jack Straw faced a fresh immigration crisis last night as it was revealed that hundreds of 
 Kosovan refugees given temporary permits to stay in Britain now look set to seek asylum. 
 
(4) Daily Mail, 12 Jan. 2005 
 ONE million illegal immigrants could be living in Britain, it emerged last night. 
 
The evidentials in (1) and (2) mark the information reported in the assertion as acquired via VISUAL 
PERCEPTION. The propositions in (3) and (4) are similarly presented as something made available to 
see.  Evidence from VISUAL PERCEPTION may be the strongest form of evidence available based 
on the assumption that what is seen can be believed.  
 
Evidence in the form of PROOF is found, for example, in independent ‘research’, ‘reports’, ‘results’, 
‘studies’ and ‘statistics’ which confirm the facts, often through visual perception. Statistics in 
particular are accepted as a primary means of displaying objectivity (van Dijk 2000b: 222). The 
category of PROOF then, often co-occurs with that of PERCEPTION as in (5) - (7): 
 
(5) Daily Mail, 15 March 2006 
 All international studies show that the benefit to the host community is very small. 
 
(6) The Express, 1 March 2003 
 [N]ew statistics show a record 110,700 people sought refuge here last year. This once again 
proves Britain is unable to get on top of an accelerating problem. 
    Most reliable 
 




 PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE  Intersubjective 
 EXPERT KNOWLEDGE   
 EPISTEMIC COMMITMENT  
     Subjective 
 
    Least reliable 
 (7) The Mirror, 17 Nov. 2004 
 Figures reveal 10,385 new refugees arrived between July and September – up 13 per cent on 
the previous three months. 
 
OBVIOUSNESS is invoked as evidence in examples like (8) - (10).  This form of legitimisation is 
linked to what van Leeuwen and Wodak refer to as ‘theoretical rationalisation’ – legitimisation by 
reference to ‘the facts of life’ (1999: 105). The adverbials in (8) – (10) provide support to the 
propositional claim by stating it as beyond question and just simply the case.   
 
(8) The Sun, 12 Sept. 2001 
 Phoney refugees will obviously do a runner the minute security is taken off the gates. 
 
(9) Daily Mail, 20 Feb. 2003 
 Clearly, British citizens are having to wait longer to be found houses because of the influx. 
 
(10) Sunday Times, 8 Feb. 2004 
 When even the home secretary admits he does not have a clue how many illegal immigrants 
there are in Britain, there is plainly a serious problem. 
 
It is interesting to note here that one evidential may be simultaneously related to more than one basis 
of knowledge. For example, ‘clearly’ in (7) also relates to the category of PERCEPTION. This is 
because clearly actually belongs to the semantic domain of perception – one can ‘see clearly’, ‘hear 
clearly’ etc. The use of ‘clearly’ in examples such as (7) may be given rise to by an underlying system 
of conceptual metaphors which connect the domains of knowledge and perception (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980).   In this case, the particular conceptual metaphor may be expressed as FACTS ARE 
VISIBLE.  
 
Evidentials expressing OBVIOUSNESS are often used to make apparent concessions and are 
therefore involved in the denial of racism (van Dijk 1992). Typically, denial strategies also involve an 
adversative conjunction followed by a negative predication. Consider, for example, (11), in which the 
adverb ‘clearly’ occurs once in the first clause, the concession, and once in the second clause, the 
negative predication: 
 
(11) The Daily Telegraph, 19 April 2004 
 Clearly, immigration does bring economic benefits but there are, equally clearly, costs as 
 well. 
 
Evidence from PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE is ‘marked as based on what is regarded as part of the 
communal epistemic background’ (Bednarek 2006a: 640). This form of legitimisation is therefore 
related to presupposition.  The evidential marks common ground between discourse participants and 
acts as a presupposition trigger.  This legitimising strategy also corresponds with what van Leeuwen 
and Wodak (1999: 105) refer to as ‘conformity authorisation’. It rests on the ad populum fallacy that 
something is true if everybody believes it (van Eemeren et al. 2002: 131). Consider (12) - (14): 
 
(12) Independent on Sunday, 9 Sept. 2001 
 Mr Blunkett confirms the widely held view that the UK has become a haven for people 
seeking asylum from around the world. 
 
(13) The Express, 23 Feb. 2005 
 Under Labour, Britain has become a soft touch on asylum and immigration and everybody 
knows it. [quoting shadow Home Secretary, David Davis] (14) The Daily Telegraph, 16 
Jan. 2003 
 Everyone can see that the asylum system, whatever the merits of the principle behind it, is 
not working.  
 From a purely epistemological point of view, of course, to believe that something is true simply 
because other people believe it is foolish.  From an evolved psychology point of view, however, this 
fallacy may not in fact be so naive.  As Sperber et al. (2010: 380) put it: 
 
If an idea is generally accepted by the people you interact with, isn’t this a good 
reason to accept it too?  It may be a modest and prudent policy to go along with the 
people one interacts with, and to accept the ideas they accept.  Anything else may 
compromise one’s cultural competence and social acceptability. 
 
There may therefore be an adaptive bias toward conformity of beliefs that has been selected for in 
human cognition (Henrich and Boyd 1998) and which this particular legitimising strategy exploits.   
 
A further way in which speakers can provide external coherence to their claims is to attribute 
assertions to ‘experts’ as evidence for their truth. For example, through direct or indirect quotation.   
This form of legitimisation thus involves the linguistic and cognitive process of ‘source-tagging’.  
Source-tagging is particularly prevalent in news discourse, where ‘one of the most characteristic 
features of newspaper language is its “embededness”: much of what features in the news is actually 
reported speech’ (Bednarek 2006b: 59).  Source-tagging is a form of metarepresentation, an evolved 
cognitive ability essential for inferential communication (Sperber 2000).  In attributing assertions, 
source-tagging sentences such as ‘an independent report states that P’ metarepresent previous public 
speech acts.  Verbs like ‘said’, ‘stated’ ‘claimed’, ‘warned’, etc., of course, require source-tags as 
arguments.   
 
Cosmides and Tooby (2000b) argue that source-tagging itself must have played an important role in 
the evolution of communication (p. 70).  It can be seen as part of the logico-rhetorical module 
proposed by Sperber and may therefore have evolved initially as a cognitive defence against 
Machiavellian discourse. For example, Chilton (2004: 22) states that ‘one reason why this potential 
exists could be that the ability to meta-represent constitutes a significant part of our ability to detect 
communicative deception’.  Meta-representation allows hearers to temporarily suspend the truth of a 
proposition until they have enough information about the reliability of the source to decide whether or 
not to accept it as true.  It is a kind of mental note taking. According to Cosmides and Tooby: 
 
Source tags are very useful, because often, with contingent information, one may not 
have direct evidence about its truth, but may acquire information about the reliability 
of a source. If the sources of pieces of information are maintained with the 
information, then subsequent information about the source can be used to change the 
assigned truth-status of the information either upwards or downwards. (2000b: 69)   
 
However, as we have already argued, the logico-rhetorical module would subsequently have come to 
function in argument and persuasion.  Speakers therefore have the facility to use source-tags in 
displays of external coherence intended to satisfy the hearer’s expectations of evidence.  By 
attributing assertions to third-party sources the speaker, in effect, offers a ‘guarantor’ for the truth of 
the proposition.  That guarantor, of course, must be one that the speaker at least assumes the hearer 
will consider right and reliable.  Assertions in media discourse are therefore often attributed to 
perceived sources of alliance or authority as in (15) - (17):  
 
(15) Sunday Times, 20 July 2003 
 Migrationwatch UK, a specialist think tank, says that in the next 20 years one new house 
will have to be built for every four already existing in London, the southeast and southwest of 
England. 
 
(16) The Guardian, 6 Aug. 2004 
 The government policy of dispersing asylum seekers away from London and the south-east 
may increase HIV transmission, medical experts warned last night.  
 (17) The Express, 22 Aug. 2005 
 Mr Hague said: ‘it must now be obvious to all concerned that some of our asylum and human 
rights laws are being massively abused’. 
 
This particular form of legitimisation is linked to what Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) refer to as 
‘authorisation’ – legitimisation by reference to authority. It relies on the ad verecundiam fallacy in 
which the speaker resorts to the voice of an expert to present an argument as fact (van Eemeren et al. 
2002: 131).  The antecedent authorial voice is therefore usually ‘someone in whom institutionalised 
authority is vested’ (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 104).  And as in the case of PUBLIC 
KNOWLEDGE, there may be an adapted bias toward believing the assertions of accepted authority 
figures (Sperber et al. 2010: 382).  
 
One way in which speakers provide displays of internal coherence is through argumentative forms 
expressing logical relations between propositions.  The linguistic forms involved include the para-
logical vocabulary mentioned earlier, which ‘indicate that a backing of some sort may be found in 
their context’ (Bednarek 2006a: 650).  In (18) and (19), for example, the final proposition is 
evidenced by previous propositions and the logical connection between them is made explicit by 
‘means that’.   
 
(18) Mail on Sunday, 4 March 2001 
 Last year, more than 78,000 asylum applications were turned down, and each year the 
immigration judges reject about 15,000 appeals.  But fewer than 9,000 failed applicants are 
removed which means that almost 70,000 disappear into the woodwork. 
 
(19) Sunday Times, 26 March 2006 
 The demand for new housing from immigrants means that 65,000 new homes - equivalent to 
a city the size of Peterborough -will have to be built every year for the next two decades.  
 
Backings and bases both co-occur in text to co-construct legitimisation.  Backings make explicit 
internal coherence between propositions whilst bases of knowledge provide external coherence to 
claims.  Consider by way of example the following, final extract in which both types of evidence can 
be seen. 
 
(20)   Daily Mail, 9 September 2003 
 AN astonishing 80 per cent of failed asylum seekers never leave the country, it was revealed 
yesterday [PERCEPTION]. Despite David Blunkett's claims to be tackling the asylum crisis, the 
problem is getting worse, says an analysis of Home Office figures [PROOF].  It means 
[BACKING] the number of people living here illegally is climbing by the year on top of all 
those who enter the country clandestinely without ever coming to the attention of authorities.  
The report, by independent thinktank Migrationwatch UK, warns that [PROOF; EXPERT 
KNOWLEDGE] the Government's failure to speed up deportations means that [BACKING] more 
than 200,000 asylum seekers whose cases have been thrown out in the last six years alone are 
still living here. 
 
     And far from improving, the situation is deteriorating, it says [EXPERT KNOWLEDGE].  Newly-
released Home Office figures show [EXPERT KNOWLEDGE; PROOF; PERCEPTION] the 
proportion of asylum seekers thrown out of Britain within a year of their case collapsing has 
fallen from 27 per cent in 2001 to 19 per cent in 2002. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In taking up the issues raised by Chilton (2005) we have suggested that the logico-rhetorical module, 
which evolved alongside the human communicative competence, is as much a speaker resource for 
persuasion as it is a hearer resource for protection.  As a result, ‘a significant proportion of socially 
acquired beliefs are likely to be false beliefs, and this is not just as a result of the malfunctioning, but 
also of the proper functioning of social communication .... Cognitive manipulation is one of the 
effects that makes the practices of testimony and argumentation adaptive’ (Sperber 2001).   
 
The media is a particular genre in which we might expect to find Machiavellian communication from 
which false beliefs may be derived.  For one reason, the rules of reciprocity do not apply in this genre 
and so the speaker has less to lose in communicating false, partial or distorted information.  And since 
hearers’ beliefs about the realities reported in the news are generally also garnered from the news 
rather than firsthand experience, hearers are less likely to encounter claims that are inconsistent with 
existing ideologies (notice that the reproduction of dominant discourses then becomes self-
sustaining).  Hearers can therefore be expected to exercise some sort of epistemic vigilance as Chilton 
points out.  This is normally directed at the felicity conditions for assertion.  However, the sincerity 
condition at least cannot be monitored in this genre and although the media is generally regarded as a 
valid source of information, reputation is not alone sufficient.  The emphasis is therefore likely to fall 
on evidence.  The various categories of evidentiality that we have discussed may thus perform a 
legitimising function in serving to satisfy the conditions of acceptance dictated by hearers’ logico-
rhetorical modules.  Of course, it is not the case that evidence will automatically lead to acceptance.  
Some hearers may have sufficiently little faith in the media as a source of information that no amount 
of evidence is enough.  Rather, it remains that for some hearers on some occasions, evidence is 
enough to weight the logico-rhetorical module toward acceptance.  CDA is therefore still needed to 
disclose the clandestine ideological and persuasive properties of talk and text.  However, any 
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